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Force and restraint in strategic deterrence : a game-theorist's perspective

Myerson, Roger B. (Author). Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute. (Added Author).

Summary: "In a dangerous world, we need to think very carefully about how military force is used. Game theory can serve us in such analyses by providing a framework for probing the inextricable connections between our adversaries' decision problems and our own. To illustrate the power of game theory, the author focuses on a vital question that confronts American policymakers today: what determines why an application of military force, which was intended to deter potential adversaries, sometimes instead stimulates them to more militant reactions against us? When we feel that force is necessary, what can we do to minimize the risk of such adverse reactions?" -- p. v.

Electronic resources

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Record details

Physical Description: remote
vi, 25 pages : digital, PDF file
Publisher: [Carlisle Barracks, PA : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007]

Content descriptions

General Note:	"November 2007." GPO Cataloging Record Distribution Program (CRDP). Title from title screen (viewed on Dec. 7, 2007).
Bibliography, etc. Note:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 25).
Formatted Contents Note:	Intuitive arguments against multilateral constraints on American actions -- Game theory as a form of analytical narrative -- A simple model of the strategic deterrence problem -- Judging reputations -- Reputations for restraint and resolve -- Failure of deterrence: stimulating militarism by denying restraint -- Reconsidering the rationality assumption -- Lessons for patriots.
System Details Note:	Mode of access: Internet from the STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE web site. Address as of 12/07/2007: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB823.pdf; current access is available via PURL.